

Aus: W. V. Quine: Natural Kinds, In: derselbe, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969.

S. 114f.:

Hempel's puzzle is that just as each black raven tends to confirm the law that all ravens are black, so each green leaf, being a non-black non-raven, should tend to confirm the law that all non-black things are non-ravens, that is, again, that all ravens are black. What is paradoxical is that a green leaf should count toward the law that all ravens are black.

[...]

Meanwhile the terminological point is simply that projectible predicates are predicates  $\zeta$  and  $\eta$  whose shared instances all do count, for whatever reason, toward confirmation of  $[\text{All } \zeta \text{ are } \eta]$ .

Now I propose assimilating Hempel's puzzle to Goodman's by inferring from Hempel's that the complement of a projectible predicate need not be projectible. "Raven" and "black" are projectible; a black raven does count toward "All ravens are black." Hence a black raven counts also, indirectly, toward "All non-black things are non-ravens", since this says the same thing. But a green leaf does not count toward "All non-black things are non-ravens," nor, therefore, toward "all ravens are black"; "non-black" and "non-raven" are not projectible. "Green" and "leaf" are projectible, and the green leaf counts toward "All leaves are green" and "All green things are leaves"; but only a black raven can confirm "All ravens are black", the complements not being projectible.